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1.1 Overview  
Firm performance may be the implication of making the right decisions at crucial 
period such as financial crisis period. However, there are several frequently observed 
factors that need to be in consideration such as ownership structure and capital structure. 
Emerging country such as Malaysia faced the conflicts of interests among managers and 
shareholders because of the separation of ownership from control. When the managers 
have more control power, they attempt to use the limited resources to benefit their own 
personal interests. It raised the agency and expropriation issues. Expropriation of minority 
shareholders occurred due to the weak investor protection in developing country and 
combination of management and control in the firms. When this situation happens, the 
investors’ confidence may be affected especially during the financial crisis period. This 
highlighted how important it is to have good corporate governance during Asian Crisis in 
the late 1990s. Besides, the capital market is imperfect and may influence the firm 
performances with the type of ownership structures in the organization. In short, debt ratio 
moderates the relationship between family firms and firm performance. This chapter 
discusses the background of the study, economic and capital market development in 
Malaysia, theoretical framework, problem statement, objectives, significance of study and 




1.2 Background of the Study  
Firm performance may reflect the results of making the right decisions at the 
crucial time such as during the Asian Crisis in the late 1990s. It can be either analyzed as 
the impact of firm value on market, observations of possible gains in investments or the 
efficiency estimation of investments (Sauaia, 2002). For the past literatures, Tobin Q is 
commonly used as the market performance measure while return on asset (ROA) is the 
accounting performance measure. However, there can be several frequently observed 
critical factors such as ownership structure and capital structure.  
Overall, the ownership structure around the world is either under the control of their 
founders, families or heirs. Most of the publicly listed firms in Western Europe, South and 
East Asia are family firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). They were the 
first literature that examined the supreme power and discovered that the separation effects 
benefit the large shareholders. Managers who are also the majority shareholder at the same 
time have supreme rights to affect the investment decisions made by the firms. Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) also supported the existence of separation effects. In countries 
such as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Taiwan (China), 15 to 80 
percent of the firms have managers who are the family members and controlling 
shareholders at the same time. Malaysia was recorded as the third highest family control 
concentration dominated by the family founders and descendants after Thailand and 
Indonesia. High concentrated ownership could deceased the agency issue between 
managers and shareholders because shareholders would be observing managers but the 
managers are appointed among the family members for the concentrated ownership such as 
Malaysia. Therefore, conflicts are raised between majority shareholders who plays the 
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responsibility of managers and minority shareholder. This is the essential reason to monitor 
the influence of family ownership on the firm performance.   
Besides, the importance of good corporate governance practice was highlighted 
during financial distress period such as Asian Financial Crisis 1997 and Global Financial 
Crisis 2008 (Zulkafli, Abdul Samad & Ismail, 2007). The concentrated ownership in 
Malaysia has negative relationship with firm performance and is inferred by the weak 
investor protection of minority shareholders (Tam & Tan, 2007). The weak governance 
also raised the expropriation and tunneling issues (Friedman, Johnson & Mitton, 2003). 
The majority shareholders who acts as managers tend to tunnel the resources out of the 
firms for their own personal benefits when the investor protection is weak. This affects the 
firm performance and raised the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
managers are not acting in the best interest of shareholders. On the other hand, several 
researches such as Sayilgan and Sayman (2012), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) pointed out that family firms perform better than non-family 
firms because they need professional managers when the ownership is less concentrated. 
Managers prefer to use equity financing to avoid firms from financial distress. In other 
words, shareholders protections were insufficient during the crisis and caused devaluation 
in investments. Practicing good corporate governance gives directions on principle and best 
practices in corporate governance, obligation and plan the future aspects of corporate 
governance in Malaysia. 
Another crucial factor of firm performance is capital structure. Studies on capital 
structure came to attention after the study of Modigliani and Miller (1958). In the perfect 
capital market, it is assumed to be frictionless, same capital flows across projects in 
economy and expected that there is symmetric relationship. Yet, it is generally accepted 
4 
 
that the market is imperfect in the real world. It academically contributed to the 
development of alternative theories such as trade-off theories, pecking order theory and 
agency theory (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Besides, excessive use of debts may cause the firms 
to be vulnerable during financial crisis period (Halim Ahmad & Hiau Abdullah, 2013). It is 
crucial that optimal level of debts where the firms maximize their value. This study proved 
that firms should not raise the level of debts beyond the optimal level because it did not 
add value to the firm and might placed it in financial distress position. Moreover, bigger 
firms in Malaysia relied more on equity than debt financing (Suhaila & Mahmood, 2009). 
This is the unique characteristics of Malaysia’s capital structure.  
Based on the discussion above, it shows that firm performance reflects the effect of 
making the right decision based on ownership structure and capital structure. Family 
ownership may be contributive to influence the control and management prospect that may 
eventually caused changes on capital structures and firm performance. However, the past 
literatures do not emphasize much on the relationship between the ownership structure, 
capital structure and firm performance. The development of capital structure and economy 
in Malaysia is discussed in the next section to have better understanding of how these 








1.3 Economic and Capital Market Development in Malaysia 
According OECD Economic Assessment Survey 2016, Malaysia was reported as 
one of the most successful Southeast Asian economies and aims to become a high-income 
country by 2020. To accomplish this aim, Malaysia shall strengthen ongoing structural 
reforms as stated in the 11th Malaysia Plan (RMK11). Therefore, the economic assessment 
focuses on promoting inclusive productivity by increasing productivity and improving 
inclusive growth. Malaysia had sustained rapid average growth of average real GDP 
growth 6.4% per year since 1970. In the progress, Malaysia transformed from dependence 
on agriculture and commodity exports to a more diversified and open economy with strong 
bonds in global value chain. The economy was projected to grow at over 4% per year 
throughout the year 2016-17. Monetary and fiscal policy should maintain sensible to aid 
improve growth and keep the resilience of the economy to shocks. The rapid and inclusive 
growth facilitates the development of manufacturing, boosting growth, employment and 
productivity by extending access to global markets, capital, knowledge and technology. 
Due to the effort of reinforcing macro-prudential policies and boosting the financial 
sectors, the shock of Asian Financial Crisis 1997-98 and 2008 Global Financial Crisis was 
reduced and nurtured with business-friendly investment environment. During the 2008 
crisis period, real GDP growth averagely 5.3% per year with services sector representing 
more than half of the GDP.    
 Malaysia also achieves market leading position in the global capital market with its 
spectrum of unique offerings (Capital Markets Malaysia, 2015). Malaysia has the highest 
bond market in ASEAN and is amongst the top three countries with the largest bonds 
outstanding in Asia.  Malaysia also hosts the largest unit trust industry and leads the market 
in the global sukuk market. Due to the great achievements in Malaysian capital market, 
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Malaysia was promoted to Advanced Emerging Market in FTSE Global Equity Index 
Series in 2013. Capital Markets Malaysia (CMM) was developed by Securities 
Commission (SC) to optimize further growth and internationalization of Malaysia’s capital 
market. CMM focuses on the four main pillars of the market: Equities, Fixed Income, 
Asset Management and Alternative Assets with highlights on the Islamic Capital Market 
(ICM) and Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI) framework to ensure spectrum 
expansion of product offerings to all potential issuers and investors. Malaysia also gives 
chances for capital market investment growth since it is one of the most developed 
economies in Southeast Asia. It has naturally become a global marketplace for such growth 
due to both firm governance infrastructure and instinctive government approval.  
Moreover, Malaysia’s leading role in ASEAN regional bloc and Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) offers chances for good growth potential in near future. Plus, the 
Malaysian market is suitable platform for publicly listed companies (PLCs) and small-to-
medium-sized companies (SME) to search for the incredible modes of capital formation.  
Investors, then, can has less worries in producing sustainable long-term investment returns 
that will be exerted by stable long-term growth aspects in the commodities, manufacturing 
and services industries.  
Lastly, a progressive area driven by young generation and exponential growth 
potential implies Malaysia and ASEAN as better option than matured market. Economic 
growth is optimized by the sustainable, inclusive and innovative prospect of capital market 
in Malaysia. CMM provides insights from authorities to assure the issuers and investors 
into participating in the investments and fundraising and yet remain dedicated to industry 
development. SC, a statutory body reporting to the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia was 
established under Securities Commission Act 1993. Its role as sole regulatory agency for 
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regulation and development of capital market gives it responsibility to supervise and 
monitoring the activities of market institutions, including exchanges and clearing houses, 
and regulating the persons licensed under the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007.  
From the discussion above, Malaysia has developed from focusing on agriculture 
and commodity exports to a more diversified and open market. It also gained several 
achievements and brought new improvements in the capital markets. However, the 
concentrated ownership in Malaysia raised the expropriation issue which will be discussed 
in the next section.  
 
1.4 The Expropriation Issue  
In developing countries, the weak corporate governance practice among the firms 
raised the expropriation issue (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000). 
Expropriation is generally related to agency problem raised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
who focused on the managers consumption and empire building. Insiders or managers who 
have excessive control attempt to use profits for their own personal benefits rather than 
returning the money to the outside investors. Therefore, expropriation issue on minority 
shareholders and creditors is common in many countries. Manager expropriations also may 
affect the investors’ confidence especially during financial crisis (Johnson, Boone, Breach 
& Friedman, 2000). For illustration, investor’s confidence wavered and influenced the 
capital flows of all the emerging market countries during the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-
98. This implied that Asian crisis is sensitive to changes on exchange rate and stock market 
performances. Although the crisis effect do not convey which countries were vulnerable to 
confidence loss, it relayed the fact that changes on exchange rate and stock market 
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performances on confidence loss occurred due to investor’s protection. Thus, corporate 
governance can be a crucial measure of macroeconomic problems in crisis period.  
Survey done by Gama and Galvao (2012) also pointed out that investor protection 
of minority shareholders from expropriation of large shareholders should be increased. 
Overall, the past literatures indicated that family firms have better performance than non-
family firms but only occur in situation where the link between family ownership and 
performance cannot be defined without difference of control and cash flow right. They 
predicted that shares owned by family firms will be decreased through the practice of 
efficient financial market. This showed that family firms play an important role in share 
market nowadays. The argument that family firms operate more efficient than professional 
firms because of less monitoring was also arguable. Managers and large family 
shareholdings are often the same person, so no separation between management and 
ownership compensate the firms with less or zero monitoring and discipline costs. Family 
firms owned the incentive, power and information to control the managers, decreased free-
rider agency costs and raised returns. However, family differences and role conflict can 
lead to inability to work in the best of the firms. This was why the influences of family 
firms on the firm were studied.  
Moreover, wealth expropriation due to concentrated shareholders such as family 
firms might occur when ownership and management is combined (Gama & Rodrigues, 
2013). It was empirically demonstrated that family firms did better job than non-family 
firms in term of accounting performance. They reported that high family involvement in 
management level seems to reduce managerial opportunism. However, it did not revealed 
as increase in valuation but as alignment incentive between combine of large shareholders 
and firm value. Another way to channel family’s private benefit is through board 
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dominance. For instance, US family firms performed better in both ROA and Tobin q 
because US dominated by common laws and; provides high protection to investors and 
creditors (Corstjens, Maxwell & Heyden, 2004). Contrast with US, French used civil law 
regime, provides low protection to investors and creditors, less efficiency and family firms 
are common among large quoted firms. They observed that these performance differences 
were mainly influenced by ownership structures and concluded that families prone to 
sustain their control in the firms with higher effective cost of capital than being equal to 
non-family firms.  
 






Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical basis used in this study is the agency theory. Agency theory 
postulates separation of ownership from control caused the conflicts of interest between 
owners and managers which influence the capital structure decisions as well as firm 
performances to satisfy their own private benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It is a 
Separation of ownership from control raised the agency conflicts among 
owners and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Different ownership 




written contract between the principal nominated the agent to complete certain tasks on 
their behalf including decision making authority delegation to agents. 
As theoretical basis, this theory is applicable to this study because corporate 
governance separated the firm’s control from ownership with condition where 
managements have more control compared to shareholders. Managers tend to use the 
limited resources to fulfill their own personal benefits rather than in the interests of 
shareholders. This condition is described as agency problem. Family firms can choose to 
use more debts or rely more on the equity. Family firms either has positive, negative or 
opposite influence on both capital structure and firm performance depending on the firm’s 
characteristics. When different capital structure decisions are made by the family firms, the 
firm may perform differently because it bears different level of risks. 
Besides, leverage was predicted to have inverse impact on agency costs (Margaritis 
& Psillaki, 2009). Based on the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model, they 
postulated that increased use of debts reduce the agency costs, decreasing inefficiency and 
enhance the firm performance with estimation that inverse connection may occur when 
disciplinary influence of increasing leverage became indefensible. Since the interests of 
management are unnecessarily to be aligned with shareholders, guiding the ownership 
structures is important especially to test agency cost model. Thus, from Figure 1 above, it 
shows that different ownership structures have different effects on leverage which in the 
end may affect the firm performance. In short, any changes on debt ratio moderate the 





1.6 Problem Statement  
 Empirical studies supported that factors such as ownership structure and capital 
structure are useful in predicting the firm performance (Boroujeni, Noroozi, Nadem & 
Chadegani, 2013a). Family ownership only affects the firm performance when it is 
combined with certain type of family control and management (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
On the other hand, several researches such as Sayilgan and Sayman (2012), Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) pointed out that family firms perform better 
than non-family firms because they need professional managers when the ownership is less 
concentrated. Shyu and Shen (2011) also supported that family firms did perform better 
than non-family firms. The mix of equity ownership and management rights helped the 
family firms to lower the agency costs and boost the firm value in the long run. This 
affirmed that the influence of family ownership on firm performance should be monitored.  
There are several issues related to ownership structure such as separation effect, 
expropriation of minority shareholders and tunneling were raised by researchers in past 
literatures. Separation of control from management caused the conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. The roots of ownership structures are often associated with 
principal-agent framework where principal nominated an agent to complete the tasks on 
their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers who have extreme control tend to 
transfer the limited resources for their own personal benefit. However, majority firms in 
Malaysia are family firms with concentrated ownership, so there is no separation effect of 
control from management. It was reported through the study of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (1999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). This could be a barrier 
towards developing better governance and turned out to be the initiative towards 
conducting this study for further improvements. Moreover, expropriation of minority 
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shareholders due to weak corporate governance in developing country such as Malaysia 
was highlighted during Asian Financial Crisis. Expropriation on the minority shareholders 
and creditors may also happen when managers are unwilling to return the money to them 
(Johnson, Boone, Breach & Friedman, 2000). This caused the investors to lose confidence 
especially during financial crisis.  
Empirical evidences were also found on capital structure. Shubita and Alsawalhah 
(2012) stressed the relevance of capital structure in determining the firm’s survival in the 
competitive market. Capital structure decisions also differ based on individual’s and 
institution’s preferences (Titman, 2002), capital structure theories (Harris & Raviv, 1991) 
and stages of economic development (Mahmud, Herani, Rajar & Farooqi, 2009). Control 
variables also have different effects on debt ratio in different countries. It is either 
negatively (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Suhaila & Mahmood, 2009; Fattouh, Scaramozzino & 
Harris, 2005) or positively (Eriotis, Vasiliou & Ventoura-Neokosmidi, 2007) related to 
leverage. Hence, it is crucial to develop optimal capital structure to decrease firm’s 
vulnerability towards economic downturn (Liew & Mohamad Jais, 2013; Halim Ahmad & 
Hiau Abdullah, 2013).  
From the statement above, separation effects may cause investors to lose 
confidence if the expropriation on minority shareholders and creditors happened especially 
during financial crisis. The example above also shows that firms need to make 
transformation to survive in the dynamic and competitive market. Thus, it is crucial to 
make the right capital structures decisions in the management to sustain the firm’s long-
term growth. It also implied the moderating effect of capital structure on the relationship 
between ownership structures and firm performance. Different ownership structures make 
different capital structures decisions and this influences the firm performance.   
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1.7 Objectives of Study 
Objectives guide researchers to ensure the planning goes smoothly and effectively. 
It also defines what the researchers want to find out and aims what to be examined in the 
study. The objectives of the study are to examine the hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between family firms and debt ratio on firm performance of the sample firms listed in both 
industrial and consumer product industries that are listed in Bursa Malaysia.  
Specific objectives:  
a) To examine the relationship between family firms and firm performance  
b) To examine the relationship between debt ratio and firm performance  
c) To examine the moderating effect of debt ratio on the relationship between family 
firms and firm performance 
 
1.8 Significance of Study 
The study investigates how the ownership structures and capital structures related 
to one another which in the end influence the firm performance. Agency theory is used to 
explain the relationship and this theory is applied to this study. Significance of study 
defines the importance and purposes of conducting the study. It also raises interests and 
describes how it benefits the society and those who are involved. The significances are 




(a) Practicing good corporate governance in the emerging countries gains the investors’ 
confidences and boosts the economic growth in Malaysia.  
Corporate governance was only actively promoted after the collapse of East Asian 
economies in the late 1990s (Zulkafli, Abdul Samad & Ismail, 2007). The crisis was 
affected by the weaknesses of domestic policy. Many measures were implemented to 
improve the aspect of fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility in managing 
the corporations. Failure to good corporate governance will affect the firms’ liquidity to 
operate efficiently. It also eases the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, 
making ways to a more efficient capital market. This boosts the country’s economic growth 
and inflows of foreign direct investments. In short, good corporate governance is the 
source for sustainable economic growth and helps to gain the investors’ confidence to 
invest.   
 
(b) There is little study focused on the relationship between ownership structures, capital 
structures and firm performances (Roshan, 2009). Therefore, this study is conducted to be 
contributive to the study gap.  
Previous studies focused either the relationship between ownership structures and firm 
performance or the relationship between capital structures and firm performance (Nadaraja, 
Zulkafli & Masron, 2011; Roshan, 2009). Recent researches mainly emphasize on the 
relationship between capital structure and ownership structure  that influencing top 
managements in making strategic decisions compared to focus on the relationship between 
capital structure and firm performance. Overall firm performance will be affected if there 
are any changes on strategic decisions. This shows that capital structure decisions are 
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essential for firms to maximize returns to stakeholders and adapt themselves into the 
competitive market.  
 
(c) Exposure to better corporate governance practices decreases the expropriation and 
tunneling issue among the minority shareholders and creditors.  
In developing countries, tunneling and expropriation issues are common because of the 
weak corporate governance. When the investors’ protection is weak, the entrepreneurs 
tunnel the resources out of the firms (Friedman, Johnson & Mitton, 2003). On the other 
hand, expropriation is often associated with agency problem (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 2000). Managers or insiders who have extreme control attempt to use 
the resources for their personal benefits rather than returned the money to investors. Thus, 
expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors are common in developing countries. 
With better corporate governance practices, stronger investors’ protection is developed. 
Besides, a more efficient capital allocation, high growth financial markets and dispersed 
shares of ownership across the firms. This shows how the exposure of good corporate 
governance practices help to decrease expropriation and tunneling issues among 
developing countries.  
 
(d) Awareness of the importance to have good corporate governance is raised to the public. 
It helps to enhance the investors’ protection and encourage the economic growth of firms 
among the developing countries.  
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(e) Investors can have more information regarding the projects or investments they 
consider to invest when more information about family ownership, capital structures and 
firm performance are exposed to the public. This enables them to make better, efficient and 
accurate predictions or estimations on the market condition. Thus, they can avoid 
themselves from being expropriated by managers or insiders who have great control over 
management in the firm.      
 
1.9 Organization of Study 
This study emphasizes on the relationship between family ownership and debt ratio 
which in the end influence the firm performance among randomly picked Malaysian firms 
selected from both industrial and consumer product industries. It focuses from year 2007 to 
2013. This study is divided to five chapters which are:-  
 Introduction 
 Literature reviews 
 Methodology 











2.1 Introduction  
The effect of ownership structures and capital structures on firm performances has 
been debated globally for decades, especially on the developed countries. Different 
ownership structure use different capital structures and caused different impacts on the firm 
performances. In this chapter, reviews of previous studies related to this study are included. 
This proves that developing countries like Malaysia also supported the relationship 
between family firms, capital structures and firm performances, especially based on agency 
theory.   
 
2.2 Overview of Sample Sectors in Malaysia 
Malaysia, newly industrialized country, experienced an economic boom and had 
rapid development during the late 20th century (Economy Watch, 16 March 2010). 
Malaysia has grown from emerging market into advanced emerging market, creating niche 
areas of expertise and gives stable long-term growth (Capital Markets Malaysia, 2015). 
The key focus of the economy in Malaysia is diversified, stability and opportunities. As 
diversified economy, it has become the leading exporter of electrical appliances, electronic 
parts and components, palm oil and natural gas. Malaysia is also the world’s largest 
producer of tin, rubber and palm oil (Economy Watch, 16 March 2010). Besides, Malaysia 
was also the 28th largest oil producer and 17th largest natural gas producer in the world in 
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2010. Malaysia moved slowly towards the third stage of economic development by 
emphasizing on services nowadays. It can be seen through the implementation of Industrial 
Master Plan (IMP3), which is to transform the country into a major trading nation with 
emphasis on services and human capital. Therefore, it caused service sector to have 49.3 
percent of GDP in 2010. It is part of the national development strategy to venture into new 
growth area, increase the economic base for exports and sustained growth in economy to 
reach the vision of becoming developed country by 2020. According to the 10th Malaysia 
Plan (RMK10), the service industry aimed to reach 61 percent of GDP by 2015 and 
Malaysia government is expected to invest nearly RM687.7 billion over the next fifteen 
years into services alone. Malaysia is also competing against Bahrain to be the world 
leader in Islamic banking and allowing foreign banks to open new branches in the country. 
Industry was responsible for 41.6 percent of Malaysia’s GDP and had the 37th highest 
industrial production growth rate in the world at 7.5 percent in 2010. With Malaysia’s 
chairmanship of ASEAN and establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
in 2015, economic integration among the ASEAN members will be the main aim for a 
single market and production base, which will generate ample growth opportunities for 
investors in Malaysia within and beyond ASEAN community (Capital Markets Malaysia, 
2015). 
On the other hand, consumer product firms faced both the global economic impact 
on consumer spending and the rise of a more demanding and digitally empowered 
consumer (Conroy, 2015). Consumer sector is known as a secondary sector of the firms 
that consider those economic sectors and produces a complete tangible item (Nurulain 
Mohamed Ramli et al., 2013). Its purpose is to send the output of primary sector and make 
complete items, then trade or sell to the domestic consumers or locations where it is useful 
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for other businesses. In Malaysia, consumer sectors can be divided to two types which are 
light industry that focused on consumers need with little capital intensive and heavy 
industry that focused more on capital intensive. This sector has improved drastically for the 
previous two decades because of the increased population growth and improved standard 
of living. As the economy grew, the demand on food and beverages, clothes and utilities 
will also increase accordingly.  
However, consumer spending in United States (U.S.) remained relatively restrained 
due to causes such as present medium wage growth, comparatively high savings ratio and 
the increase in income and wealth inequality (Conroy, 2015). 79 percent of consumers had 
perception that U. S. economy was facing recession, 94 percent responded that they 
remained caution and spending at present ratio although the economy enhanced, and 83 
percent responded that they observed every spending category closely to identify which 
spending they could save. Moreover, use of Internet and social media to compare the price, 
research on the products or product purchases through website and mobile apps made 
consumer tend to express their opinions broadly. Consumers nowadays also prefer to have 
more transparency, so it is mandatory to give satisfactory responses on consumer inquiry 
and feedbacks efficiently. However, the disturbing issues such as more M&A activity in 
U.S. grocery retail market, the increasing use of digital commerce as the strategic sales 
medium when online shopping became trend and development of new business model 
affected the industry growth. To enhance the growth and/or innovation, companies can take 
into consideration the following steps: 
(a) micro-segmentation of consumers where individuals are willing to pay greater 
premium for products that are innovated specially for them 
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(b) improved digital features boost the consumers preferences -  have better connection 
with target consumers  
(c) protected data privacy and security for competitive advantage – consumers are 
assured that the trust they have in consumer products brand is warranted     
 
Consumer sector in Malaysia such as food and beverages (F&B) subsector is 
expected to grow continuously due to flexible nature, boosted by strengthening US dollar 
(for net exporters) and depressed trend of global commodity market (Borneo Post Online, 
10 October 2015). Implementation of goods and services tax (GST) also boosted certain 
quantity of pre-stocking activities that caused big changes between the first quarter of 2015 
(1Q15) and 2Q15 sales. Unsurprisingly, local sentiment decreased by 1.2 percent as shown 
by Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) from 72.6 points in 1Q15 to 71.7 points in 2Q15 
when GST was implemented. This is probably due to the consumers’ nervousness to face 
the decrease of crude oil prices, sharp collapse in RM and uncertainties when GST is 
implemented.  
However, the consumers are slow in adaption to new costing environment as well 
as recovery from fear and anxiety on internal and external warnings. Overall, consumer 
sectors are reiterated as “neutral” stance because GST implementation is expected to 
influence the consumer psychologically rather than the overall consumers’ spending 
pattern (Borneo Post Online, 7 April 2015). The GST might create psychological obstacle 
on consumers from have normal spending for certain period of time. 6-months adaptation 
period of consumers to new costing environment is unavoidable. Therefore, Price Control 
and Anti-Profiteering Act 2011 was enforced to observe, control and take action on any 
raise on price to have excessive profiteering in combination of GST implementation. It 
